Show simple item record

Antitrust Enforcement as a Cause of Google’s Innovation (2001-2013)

dc.contributor.author Fischer-Zernin, Maxime
dc.date.accessioned 2015-06-30T14:00:44Z
dc.date.available 2015-06-30T14:00:44Z
dc.date.issued 2015-06-30
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/10238
dc.description.abstract In this paper I consider the role of antitrust enforcement as a driver of innovation at Google. My hypothesis is that President Obama increased antitrust enforcement relative to his predecessor, George W. Bush, leading Google to increase its rate of innovation. I review literature regarding the role of antitrust as a driver of high-tech innovation, and use regression analysis to determine to what extent, if at all, Google’s innovation can be linked to antitrust enforcement. A holistic appraisal of the data finds mixed support for my hypothesis, varying by measurement method. This demonstrates the importance of measures of enforcement and innovation, as well as measurement method selection, which play a role in the outcome of the tests.
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.subject antitrust
dc.subject google
dc.subject competition
dc.subject patents
dc.subject innovation
dc.title Antitrust Enforcement as a Cause of Google’s Innovation (2001-2013)
dc.type Honors thesis
dc.department Political Science


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record