Missile Defense within the Context of Extended Deterrence: The Uncertain Security Commitments in the Korean Peninsula

Previous research examining the deterring effect of a missile defense has asserted that

such a missile defense|damage-limiting capability |decreases the vulnerability of

the United States(US) and enhances its security guarantee to allies. However, the

puzzle of how to convince the potential challenger of the credibility of the threat

inherent in an extended deterrence remains unsolved. In this paper, I present a game-

theoretic model of the deployment of a missile defense which I use to demonstrate

the gap between the resolve of the US as inferred from that deployment and the

actual security commitment of the US to the region in which the missile defense is

installed. Such a discrepancy weakens the credibility of the US security umbrella

and consequentially lowers the likelihood of success of a policy based thereon which

is intended to compel the behavior of an opponent. This finding suggests that a

damage-limiting force actually undermines the credibility of the deterrence threat in

an extended deterrence setting.