dc.contributor.author |
Lewis, TR |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Sappington, DEM |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2010-03-09T15:44:35Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2000-09-01 |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
0002-8282 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/2097 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
We examine how owners of productive resources (e.g., public enterprises or financial
capital) optimally allocate their resources among wealth-constrained operators of
unknown ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise profit - the resource
owner always shares the operator's profit; (2) dispersed enterprise ownership -resources
are widely distributed among operators of varying ability; (3) limited benefits of
competition - the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource;
and, sometimes, (4) diluted incentives for the most capable - more capable operators
receive smaller shares of the returns they generate. Implications for privatizations
and venture capital arrangements are explored. (JEL D82, D44, D20).
|
|
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
|
dc.language.iso |
en_US |
|
dc.publisher |
American Economic Association |
|
dc.relation.ispartof |
American Economic Review |
|
dc.title |
Motivating wealth-constrained actors |
|
dc.type |
Journal article |
|
duke.contributor.id |
Lewis, TR|0288071 |
|
pubs.begin-page |
944 |
|
pubs.end-page |
960 |
|
pubs.issue |
4 |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Duke |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Economics |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Fuqua School of Business |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Trinity College of Arts & Sciences |
|
pubs.publication-status |
Published |
|
pubs.volume |
90 |
|