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<p>This dissertation consists of three main chapters - chapter 2, 3, and 4. These
are different research problems studying the use of information. In chapter 2, we
study a mechanism design problem where the Principal hires two agents to inspect a
product, the quality of which is uncertain. The main research question we ask is the
comparison of the inspection protocols. We found the optimality of sequential inspection
among the protocols considered. We then extend the analysis to allow agents to differ
and try to understand which is the better to order the agents when using the sequential
protocol. In chapter 3, we study an information design problem where a present biased
agent could commit to an information choice to help herself to save more that she
would have. We provide a full characterization of the optimal information choice for
a risk averse present biased agent. After that, as an effort to further understand
the interaction between risk aversion and present bias, we introduce the EZKP framework
and find a counterexample where risk aversion itself has no impact on the form of
the information choice in a special case where the elasticity of the intertemporal
substitution is fixed. In chapter 4, we study an information design in games problem
where a designer chooses information for the agents to induce joint effort. We provide
two examples illustrating the relative strength of two prominent constructions of
the optimal information structure in the literature.</p>
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