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dc.contributor.advisor Miller, Ylana en_US
dc.contributor.author Bonin, Tyler en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2014-11-07T21:43:04Z
dc.date.available 2014-11-07T21:43:04Z
dc.date.issued 2014 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/9232
dc.description Thesis en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the role of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the coup against Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. Specifically, this paper argues that an expansion and redefinition of the NSC under Eisenhower ultimately led the CIA to overthrow Mossadegh, thus shifting the U.S. Intelligence Community from a primary focus on analysis to a prioritization of operations. To support this claim, this paper discusses major turning points in the development and growth of the NSC and CIA within the context of the Cold War. Furthermore, by looking at the history of oil exploitation in Iran, this paper connects the expansion of the NSC and CIA to a distortion and misinterpretation of facts surrounding Iranian oil nationalization, which further stoked fears of Soviet expansion and encouraged an operational response by the United States. en_US
dc.title Institutional Shifts and Distorted Intelligence: Examining the 1953 Coup Against Mohammad Mossadegh en_US
dc.type Masters' Thesis en_US
dc.department Graduate Liberal Studies en_US

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