The Democratic Deficit in American Policing

Limited Access
This item is unavailable until:
2025-05-24

Date

2023

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Repository Usage Stats

48
views
0
downloads

Abstract

This dissertation examines the tools residents have at their disposal to facilitate democratic accountability for carceral state actors more broadly, and municipal police, more narrowly. First, I evaluate an increasingly common institutional reform in municipal governance – civilian oversight boards. This research demonstrates that oversight boards are systematically underpowered and unable to improve police behavior. Second, I examine civilian coproduction of accountability, through complaint reporting and meeting attendance. Across two survey based experiments, I show that residents are more willing to engage in coproduction when oversight agencies have strong sanctioning powers and direct democratic influence. Finally, I display how proximal carceral exposure shapes voter turnout when residents are given direct electoral influence over policymaking. Here, I use voter files from California to show that residents of the most high carceral exposure neighborhoods are mobilized to polls in order to support a ballot measure that reduces the reach of the carceral state.

Description

Provenance

Citation

Citation

Krishnamurthy, Arvind Ram (2023). The Democratic Deficit in American Policing. Dissertation, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/27705.

Collections


Dukes student scholarship is made available to the public using a Creative Commons Attribution / Non-commercial / No derivative (CC-BY-NC-ND) license.