Empathy for Opponents: A Cognitive, Emotional, and Institutional Approach to Moral Conflict

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the role of empathy in mitigating the harms that fraught moral and political conflicts can cause. While critics of empathy have argued that it is unnecessary for morality at best and morally harmful at worst, I maintain that empathy is often needed to promote positive relationships between moral and political opponents. It is especially well suited to this task by virtue of the role it can play in helping such opponents find common ground. As I show, doing so is morally important in its own right and is also a crucial first step to avoiding a host of additional moral, epistemic, and practical pitfalls, including the tendency to dismiss the testimony of outgroup members and the inability to cooperate toward shared goals. While philosophers and social scientists have paid a great deal of attention to questions regarding the moral importance of empathy for those in need, relatively little attention has been paid to the potential moral benefits of empathy for opponents. This dissertation fills this gap while addressing the pressing problem of increased polarization, hostility, and aggression between those who are sharply opposed on issues of moral and political importance.