Presidents Fighting the Last War?: Sunk Costs, Traumatic Lessons, and Anticipated Regret in Vietnam’s “Shadow”

dc.contributor.advisor

Feaver, Peter D

dc.contributor.author

Groves, Bryan Nelson

dc.date.accessioned

2019-06-07T19:48:57Z

dc.date.available

2021-05-21T08:17:21Z

dc.date.issued

2019

dc.department

Public Policy

dc.description.abstract

Existing security studies literature focuses on causes of war onset and conditions for war termination. Yet presidents regularly face major inflexion points where they must make a major war policy change, whether to deescalate, escalate, or conduct a hybrid approach. These decision points come after significant sunk costs, including lives lost, treasure invested, and political/diplomatic capital spent. The gap in research on mid-conflict policy adaptations, and on theoretical frameworks to explain them, presents an empirical puzzle that is the subject of this dissertation.

This dissertation further scopes that topic, answering the following question. Why did presidents in the “shadow” of the Vietnam War make major war policy changes to cut losses and bring troops home, or to double down? To answer that question, this dissertation conducts a structured, focused comparison of four case studies: Lebanon (1984), Somalia (1993), Iraq (2007), and Afghanistan (2009). It is structured in that it uses the same questions to uncover presidents’ rationale across each case. It is focused in that it orients each case on a specific presidential “sunk cost trap” decision. It uses a variety of primary and secondary material, including archival research and new, senior level interviews with former administration officials and military generals.

This dissertation finds that historical “lessons” act as a filter for strategic calculations among policy elite, ultimately influencing decision outcomes. Between the Vietnam War and 9/11, the Vietnam lesson to avoid quagmires by treating sunk costs as sunk and avoiding incremental escalation was dominant. The fear, or anticipated regret, of their own “Vietnam” created deescalatory pressures on presidents, demonstrated in the exits from Lebanon (1984) and Somalia (1993-1994). After 9/11, the logic flipped due to new lessons learned, including the need for proactive counterterrorism overseas and counterinsurgency strategies. This created escalatory pressures in Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009) because of presidents’ desire to avoid another “9/11” on their watch.

dc.identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/18752

dc.subject

Public policy

dc.subject

Political science

dc.subject

Military history

dc.subject

Civil-military relations

dc.subject

Historical Lessons and Sunk Cost Traps

dc.subject

Presidential Decision Making

dc.subject

Security Studies

dc.subject

U.S. National Security Policy

dc.subject

Vietnam War

dc.subject

Lebanon

dc.subject

Somalia

dc.subject

9/11

dc.subject

Iraq Surge

dc.subject

Afghanistan Surge

dc.subject

Beirut Bombing

dc.subject

Blackhawk Down

dc.title

Presidents Fighting the Last War?: Sunk Costs, Traumatic Lessons, and Anticipated Regret in Vietnam’s “Shadow”

dc.type

Dissertation

duke.embargo.months

23

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Groves_duke_0066D_15093.pdf
Size:
5.45 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

Collections