Procedure, Power, and Policy in the Post-Reconstruction United States House of Representatives

Abstract

At the beginning of and throughout each Congress, Members adopt institutional regimes to organize the House. Their choice of regime determines how power is distributed in the chamber and, critically, where along the ideological spectrum United States public policy is produced. In this work, I (we) compare the validity of two prominent theories of congressional organization: floor theory, which contends that power is vested with all Members voting on the floor; and party theory, which contends that power is at least conditionally vested with the majority party. I examine the question of institutional regime, power distribution, and the location of public policy through two lenses: first, I take a macro view in analyzing final passage coalitions in the post-Reconstruction (1881) House; next, I take a micro view in analyzing the motion to recommit in the post-Republican Revolution (1994) House. I find that Members adopted an institutional regime empowering the majority party from approximately the adoption of Reed’s Rules (1890) to the Great Depression (1932) and again from approximately the congressional reforms of the 1970s to at least the modern decade. These results indicate that U.S. public policy likely reflected the ideal point of the median Member in the majority party during these two periods. However, I also find that neither floor nor party theory adequately explains congressional organization in the intervening mid-century period, indicating the need for further research.