Assessing Data Collection and Surveillance in the Arctic and Recommendations for the Department of Defense

Abstract

As climate change, geopolitics, and militarization are all impacting the Arctic landscape, countries and private companies are altering their Arctic posture to make a larger imprint. Russia, China, Starlink, and OneWeb join the many stakeholders in the region in enhancing their data collection and surveillance activities in recent years. My objective was to assess the current data collection and surveillance state in the Arctic, as well as evaluate how increasing government and corporate surveillance should change the U.S. Department of Defense’s data collection strategy. I provided this information to the Triangle Privacy Research Hub, to spur further scholarship and research in this area in the coming years. Through research found in books, online in academic journals and publications, and podcasts, I gathered information on Russia, China, Starlink, and OneWeb. I assessed each country or private company and its security risk to the Department of Defense based on ten criteria: 1) drones, 2) satellites, 3) ice breakers, 4) underwater cables, 5) infrastructure projects, 6) illegitimate operations in the Arctic, 7) inconsistency with international laws and norms in the Arctic, 8) Antarctic data collection and activities, 9) data usage concerns, and 10) lack of trust with the United States. For Russia, China, Starlink, and OneWeb, I assigned each criterion high, medium, or low, based on the number of pieces of evidence against Russia, China, Starlink, and OneWeb that may make them a threat to the Department of Defense. To make comparing Russia, China, Starlink, and OneWeb easier, I assigned high a point value of three, medium a point value of two, and low a point value of one. I summed up the values to determine which country or company poses the biggest security risk to the Department of Defense. Key Findings:

China poses the most serious threat to the Department of Defense, with Russia in close second place. Russia has magnified its surveillance and data collection in the Arctic through technology systems such as UAVs, satellites, drones, and underwater sea technology, as well as military operations spanning from military base construction to military exercises and Northern Sea Route exploration. Through these vehicles, Russians have been collecting environmental and scientific, military, and resource data. China has proliferated its surveillance and data collection in the Arctic through diplomacy, secret initiatives, dual use technologies, and strategic investment. China has utilized technology systems like satellites, research stations, drones, icebreakers, and submarines. The international community has voiced concern with Chinese intentions behind this data collection. Starlink and OneWeb do not pose the same concerns to the Department of Defense. Nonetheless, they highlight a trend of private sector companies gaining more influence in the Arctic.

Key Recommendations:

To respond to Russia, the U.S. Department of Defense should 1) publish an annual report exploring Russian activities, such as drones, satellites, and icebreaker movements, and how these various technologies can collect data that could be harmful to U.S. national security, 2) lobby for a joint monitoring and data collection platform at the Arctic Council, and 3) invest in joint military exercises with Arctic Council countries and NATO. To respond to China, the Department of Defense should take these three actions: 1) develop a Polar Defense Working Group to ensure data collection in both the Arctic and Antarctic is in line with international norms, treaties, and laws, 2) leverage the Arctic Council to conduct universal research station inspections and studies on how dual use technologies could be harmful to regional security, and 3) devote more resources to grow U.S. icebreaker presence in the Arctic. To ensure Starlink and OneWeb continue to align with U.S. national security data collection and surveillance goals, the Department of Defense should 1) build a voluntary data-sharing platform between Arctic companies and the U.S. national security community, 2) invest in targeted hiring efforts to recruit private sector executives to strengthen the DOD and its Arctic strategy, and 3) design an annual Arctic Satellite Collaboration Forum.