Browsing by Subject "Program evaluation"

This dissertation examines the potential of information-provision in motivating behavior that reduces human exposure to arsenic in drinking-water in Bangladesh. In chapter 2, the longer-term effects of the countrywide arsenic-testing and information-program are examined by tracking tube-well switching behavior of households over a five-year period. Chapter 3 focuses on the effects of arsenic information communication formats on tube-well switching behavior, by employing a randomized field experiment. In chapter 4, an instrumental variables approach is used to understand whether a household's decision to switch sources is affected by its proximate neighbors' decisions to switch sources. To answer these questions, primary data was collected by the researchers through field-work in Bangladesh. The results suggest that arsenic-testing and information-provision programs produce persistent behavioral changes that reduce exposure to arsenic, with their impact increasing over time. Comparing the impacts of risk-communication formats, we find that quantitative formats do not significantly increase source-switching behavior, in comparison to that generated by qualitative formats. Lastly, despite econometric identification issues, our data suggest that households gather information about source-switching by observing the actions of their neighbors. In sum, the results presented in this dissertation suggest that the provision of information to rural households can motivate health-improving behavior that reduces households' exposure to arsenic in Bangladesh. This dissertation contributes to the use of information disclosure as a policy instrument to reduce exposure to environmental contaminants.

This dissertation presents three program evaluations in environmental and resource economics. In the first chapter, I ask whether rural roads can contribute to a reversal of tree cover loss. Prior literature shows roads to be strong drivers of deforestation; however, I hypothesize that in some settings the opposite relationship may hold. Roads may (1) increase the relative productivity of labor in non-agricultural sectors, reducing agricultural activity and allowing reforestation; (2) raise profits from forest management or plantations by linking markets, encouraging forest planting; and (3) provide access to imported fuel sources, reducing pressure on forests from firewood collection. I use a large-scale rural road construction program in India to explore these possibilities. I construct a nationwide, village-level panel, and estimate the impacts of roads on tree cover using a differences-in-differences approach. In aggregate I find that road construction contributed to tree cover expansion, in great contrast to the existing empirical road-forest literature. I also find considerable variation in road impacts across settings within India: frontier settings saw reductions in tree cover due to new roads, while less isolated settings with more established agriculture saw increases in tree cover.

In the second chapter, I apply similar quasi-experimental methods to a very different question: does rights-based fisheries management increase fish prices? Rights-based management, specifically “catch shares,” is known to extend fishing seasons by slowing the destructive “race to fish.” This reduces fishing costs. It may also increase fishing revenues, because longer fishing seasons reduce product gluts that depress prices. I test this hypothesis for the majority of U.S. catch share fisheries (all those with data available) using an individually matched control fishery for each treated, catch share fishery and a difference-in-differences approach. I find evidence for increased ex-vessel prices among fisheries that undergo season decompression; however, highly variable results suggest that there is a need for a richer theoretical understanding of transitions to rights-based management. I discuss effort substitution in multispecies fisheries systems as a possible explanation for this heterogeneity.

In the third chapter, I consider how environmentally beneficial actions can be incentivized by conditional payments (i.e. payments made in return for specific actions or outcomes) in collective land management settings. I use a framed field-lab experiment with participants from collective lands enrolled in a new payments for ecosystem services (PES) program in Mexico. I test the impact of increasing collective conditionality. Because social interactions are integral in collective decision-making, I also test the impact of PES design features that aim to improve group cooperation. Greater collective conditionality raised contributions, with higher impact on lower baseline contributors. Giving groups a way of participating in program rule-setting further improved their cooperation with those rules.

The increased use of information disclosure in environmental policy raises questions of whether and how provision of information motivates changes in behavior. Accurate assessment of the value of information provision in reducing environmental risks requires understanding how actors respond to risk information. Chapter two examines the effects of disclosure of information on risk perception, knowledge about risks, and actions to mitigate risk from arsenic in private drinking well water. We conduct an experiment where we manipulate how information about the health risks posed by arsenic in drinking water is presented to users of private wells. This is one of the first field experiments to look at framing effects for long-term, latent environmental health risks. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we find that information frame does not affect risk perception or actions taken to address risk for low level of risk.

Chapter three examines how risk perceptions are affected by variations in risk communication, specifically addressing questions raised in the field experiment. We conduct an experiment about the health risks posed by arsenic in drinking water and introduce four manipulations in communication with experimental subjects: arsenic level, information framing, bright lines and relative risk. Chapter three suggests careful consideration must be taken in designing the disclosure of moderate levels of risk to ensure that information disclosure programs effectively convey health-based recommendations. Without these considerations, information disclosure programs may unwittingly and unnecessarily heightening concern among people facing moderate levels of risk. We consider this finding especially important because a broad number of environmental and environmental health risks that are currently unregulated pose moderate levels of risk.

The final chapter asks if the act of disclosing information changes the behavior of those who provide the information. Chapter four seeks to determine the degree to which information disclosure, in the form of TRI, results in improvements in environmental performance. Our work isolates the effect of information disclosure by using changes in the TRI reporting requirements to help identify the causal effect of disclosure from other potential explanations of changes in environmental performance. We find limited evidence that facilities newly reporting for a chemical have greater proportional decreases in total releases. The policy implications of Chapter 4 suggest that information disclosure should not be considered a substitute for regulation of toxic chemicals.