



James Edward Miller. *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974*.

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case for the importance of the individual in constructing and implementing foreign relations. Even though he somewhat exaggerates Johnson's decisiveness and minimizes his preoccupation with other issues, he justifies the focus on LBJ. Over the years many historians have privileged a bottom-up approach or focused on large systemic or institutional forces to explain international affairs. By leaving out the policy maker, however, they have ignored the most basic factor in explaining how the United States interacted with the world. A tight focus on a leader might similarly minimize significant external details and dynamics, and an author must guard against such omissions, but it is undeniable that final decisions usually come from the top.

Lumbers, then, is right to focus on Johnson. Nevertheless, there are other important questions he ought to have asked. How did Johnson's China policy reflect broad goals of "bridge-building" across the Cold War divide? Did approaches to China parallel or depart from initiatives the administration took with other countries? Was Johnson more, or less, imaginative on policy toward China? Were there broad societal influences shaping the environment within which Johnson made his choices: for instance, racism which remained pervasive across American society and influenced so many high-level officials? What impact did the Sino-Soviet dispute have? Did social science theory about modernization, which captivated thinkers like Walt Rostow, shape policy? How important was it that Mao Zedong believed himself to be leader of the Third World? Did the Johnson administration listen to non-government China specialists and the views of the American public?

Finally, what Lumbers makes apparent in boldly stating the mission of his study—to demonstrate that the Johnson years were not empty of progress on China—is how mired in mistaken assumptions historians and pundits have been. The traditional picture of a rigid Washington that stood still throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and most of the 1960s awaiting Richard Nixon's daring leadership was exaggerated and misleading, providing simplistic answers to important questions. In each of these periods there were developments, mostly behind the scenes, that facilitated subsequent movement. Thus, we now know that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson thought seriously about diplomatic relations with China before the Korean War, that Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles wanted better relations with Beijing, and that some, if minor, adjustments occurred in the Kennedy years. (Kennedy, it might be noted, emerged as the least supple of the presidents, according to Noam Kochavi's *A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years* [2002].) Lumbers is right to object that Nixon has received too much credit for transforming Sino-American relations. He does not, however, resist the temptation to celebrate Johnson for policies that LBJ inherited. Nevertheless, Lumbers's

careful discussion of what emerged from the Johnson years is long overdue and will be widely appreciated.

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JAMES EDWARD MILLER. *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2009. Pp. xvi, 301. \$45.00.

When Greece's civil war came to an end in 1949, the United States was presumably in a position to use its military, economic, and cultural power to secure its critical interests within the country: checking Soviet influence, breaking the power of a national communist movement, and modernizing the nation. But this was all easier said than done. U.S. efforts to realize these objectives during the period that James Edward Miller's book covers—from the halcyon days of Greek-American relations in the 1950s to 1974, when a "perfect storm" created an absolute debacle of diplomatic ties in the eastern Mediterranean—elicited responses from Greece's elites that were often antithetical to American objectives.

As Miller's careful examination of the U.S.-Greek relationship during this era makes clear, American power and influence was much more limited than many suppose. In fact, he argues, while the United States, because of policies such as its post-April 1967 acceptance and support of the Greek junta, bears some burden for Greece's incomplete political reconstruction after the civil war, Greece's politicians, military, monarchy, and Orthodox Church bear even more responsibility for that result. Their responses to American power and influence (both real and perceived) in the decades following World War II were informed by their struggles for power among themselves, the burden of a national identity created through resistance to foreign intervention, and the legacy of a political system built on patronage.

In this short but carefully researched history, Miller seeks to get the facts right: to frame specific developments within a broader explanatory framework, and then to look closely at the evidence that supports one argument or another. When it comes to delineating that framework, he attempts to distinguish between truth and what he calls "ethnic truth." The latter, he contends, derives from the fact that Greeks, like Americans, are a people with a sense of their own exceptionalism, special character, and mission; unlike Americans, however, their views are colored by a sense of inferiority to the West and often animated by an inflated view of their country's importance. Locked into what they see as a subordinate relationship to the United States (a perception that generates expectations framed by their patronage system), Greeks feel betrayed and humiliated by unhappy outcomes in history (a perception reinforced by neo-Marxist accounts that

were prevalent in the years following the Vietnam War).

As a consequence, Miller argues, the Greeks' response to their country's postwar history is to absolve themselves of blame and to develop relatively unsophisticated conspiratorial explanations for their failures, complete with invented facts (thanks in particular to Andreas Papandreou, whose account of the events that led to the 1967 coup has achieved the status of revealed truth). These "facts," Miller asserts, are impervious to any evidence to the contrary; instead, the Greeks attribute their failures to others and, in particular, to the malevolence of the United States. While one might be inclined to view this argument as a framework for a rant, Miller's study is far from it. Rather, it is a sensitive, sympathetic, evidence-based attempt to understand and lay bare the methods by which American and Greek officials cooperated and struggled over Greece's political future in the early postwar years. Miller has drawn from Greek, American, French, and British archival sources to provide an illuminating path through the thicket of complexity that surrounds critical events and undergirds the motives of the principal actors.

In Miller's judgment, the United States, Greece, and Cyprus all could have been better served by their leaders. He suggests that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, given too much credit for cunning by his critics, lacked an understanding of the region; intent on remaining at the center of power as the Nixon administration imploded, his focus on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry resulted in policies that were more incompetent than malevolent. Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III, a zero-sum game-playing political realist, internationalized the Cyprus crisis and managed to outmaneuver almost everyone who opposed him. Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, who plotted military action against Makarios, was ambitious and reckless; with his son Andreas, he polarized the nation and drove moderates to the right, paving the way for a military coup, while Andreas, through promulgation of his version of history, caused the United States to be "a national piñata" (p. 207) for the two decades that followed the coup. In the long run, Miller observes, the damage done by these leaders to Greek-American relations was limited by Turkey's desire for European Union membership and Greece's ability to influence that process for its own ends in Cyprus. Andreas Papandreou eventually returned to power in 1993 and, in Miller's judgment, because he avoided being captured by his own myths and managed to embrace more cautious policies, averted national disaster and paved the way for better diplomatic ties between the United States and Greece.

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GLEND A ELIZABETH GILMORE. *Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919–1950*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 2008. Pp. xii, 646. \$19.95.

Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore's latest work chronicles both the "long civil rights movement" and the impact that the American Left had upon it. Focusing on southern liberal and radical organizations, most notably the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), Gilmore contends that only by appreciating the efforts of these groups can we understand the breadth and depth of the civil rights struggle.

The first of the study's three sections, entitled "Inursions," examines the period from 1919 to 1930 when southern radicals initiated their campaign for civil rights. Communists took the early lead in this campaign after Lovett Fort-Whiteman, the first African American communist to visit the Soviet Union, explained to his American comrades the Soviet belief that interracial solidarity was a precursor to economic reform. The first interracial action came with the 1929 strike of the Loray Mill in Gastonia, North Carolina. Although the strike failed in its immediate objectives, Gilmore argues that the communists emerged from it more determined than ever to fight for civil rights and interracial cooperation. The Scottsboro case and the campaign to free Angelo Herndon solidified this agenda and offered southern communists new opportunities to build contacts with noncommunist organizations.

In part two, entitled "Resistance," Gilmore studies the period from 1930 to 1939 when communists successfully allied with an array of southern liberal organizations. This coalition was facilitated by the communist move toward the Popular Front, during which the party tempered its revolutionary agenda, as well as the Great Depression and the rise of the Nazis, both of which aroused fears of a fascist America. According to Gilmore, the Depression and the racial turmoil it engendered scared southern liberals who feared "that unless the South extended basic civil rights to all, Dixie could provide a beachhead for the growing Fascist threat" (p. 159). Similarly, civil rights activists equated segregation with Nazism and "redefine[d] Jim Crow as a systematic, antidemocratic malignancy that could destroy the nation" (p. 159). While many Americans had accepted segregation as a legitimate middle ground between slavery and equality, fear of fascism, the Depression, and the Popular Front convinced some southern liberals to join with communists in demanding desegregation.

In part three, entitled "Rebellion," Gilmore examines the period from 1939 to 1950 when Pauli Murray, students at Howard University, and the Workers Defense League tried to maintain the coalition of the 1930s. By 1944, Gilmore maintains, these efforts had paid dividends, and most white Americans outside the South viewed segregation as un-American. The onset of the Cold War, however, undermined the struggle as segregationists began to equate civil rights with communism. Fearing the label, liberal organizations turned away from the communist movement and the coalition fell apart.

Although the Cold War slowed this early push for civil rights, Gilmore contends that the previous decades