Incentives to Quit in Men’s Professional Tennis: An Empirical Test of Tournament Theory
Date
2018-04-18
Author
Advisors
Arcidiacono, Peter
Kim, Grace
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Abstract
This paper studies the influence of incentives on quitting behaviors in professional
men’s tennis
tournaments and offers broader implications to pay structures in the labor market.
Precedent
literature established that prize incentives and skill heterogeneity can impact player
effort
exertion. Prize incentives include prize money and indirect financial rewards (ranking
points).
Players may also exert less effort when there is a significant difference in skill
between the
match favorite and the match underdog. Results warrant three important conclusions.
First, prize
incentives (particularly prize money) do influence a player’s likelihood of quitting.
Results on
skill heterogeneity are less conclusive, though being the “match favorite” could reduce
the odds
of quitting. Finally, match underdogs and “unseeded” players may be especially susceptible
to
the influence of prize incentives when considering whether to quit.
Type
Honors thesisDepartment
EconomicsPermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/16731Citation
Walker, William (2018). Incentives to Quit in Men’s Professional Tennis: An Empirical Test of Tournament Theory.
Honors thesis, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/16731.Collections
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