How did the 2003 prescription drug re-importation bill pass the house?
Abstract
We examine the major interest groups in the debate over allowing the re-importation
of prescription drugs by utilizing a logit model and instrumental variables. Consistent
with political support approach, the evidence suggests that Representatives are maximizing
their electoral prospects: Contributions from pharmaceutical manufacturers shrink
the probability of voting for the bill; and Representatives are sensitive to their
constituencies - employees of pharmaceutical manufacturing and senior citizens. Representatives'
gender and ideology regarding free trade and subsidies are also determining factors.
However, the decision was, by and large, a partisan one: Party affiliation was the
most important factor in passing the bill. © 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation
© 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6724Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00161.xPublication Info
(2006). How did the 2003 prescription drug re-importation bill pass the house?. Economics and Politics, 18(1). pp. 27-45. 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00161.x. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6724.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
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Show full item recordScholars@Duke
Henry G. Grabowski
Professor Emeritus of Economics
Professor Grabowski specializes in the investigation of economics in the pharmaceutical
industry, government regulation of business, and the economics of innovation. His
specific interests within these fields include intellectual property and generic competition
issues, the effects of government policy actions, and the costs and returns to pharmaceutical
R&D. He has over one hundred peer reviewed articles analyzing the economics of pharmaceuticals
and also several books and monograph publica
Edward Tower
Professor Emeritus of Economics
Professor Tower specializes in finance, computable general equilibrium modeling, macroeconomics,
development economics, microeconomics, and managerial economics. He conducts a majority
of his research within the study of trade and development, exploring a variety of
variables from tariffs, quotas, and time zone arbitrage, to equities, mutual funds,
and index mutual funds. Since he began publishing his work in 1965, he has contributed
over 130 articles to leading academic journals and has had s
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