Protest Voting in Plurality Elections: A Theory of Voter Signaling

dc.contributor.author

Kselman, Daniel

dc.contributor.author

Niou, Emerson

dc.date.accessioned

2023-08-09T03:18:20Z

dc.date.available

2023-08-09T03:18:20Z

dc.date.issued

2010-06

dc.date.updated

2023-08-09T03:18:19Z

dc.description.abstract

This paper develops a model of protest voting in which unsatisfied voters may abandon their most-preferred candidate even though he or she has a good chance of winning, in the hope that this signal of disaffection will lead to downstream improvements in that candidate's performance. We use a spatial model to identify voters whose ideological profile makes protest voting an option, and an expected utility model to identify the conditions under which potential protest voters will in fact use their vote as a signaling device. Aggregate-level data provide suggestive evidence in the argument's favor. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

dc.identifier.issn

0048-5829

dc.identifier.issn

1573-7101

dc.identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/28688

dc.language

en

dc.publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

dc.relation.ispartof

Public Choice

dc.relation.isversionof

10.1007/s11127-010-9661-2

dc.title

Protest Voting in Plurality Elections: A Theory of Voter Signaling

dc.type

Journal article

pubs.begin-page

395

pubs.end-page

418

pubs.issue

3-4

pubs.organisational-group

Duke

pubs.organisational-group

Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

pubs.organisational-group

Political Science

pubs.publication-status

Published

pubs.volume

148

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