Modifying the uniform-price auction to eliminate ‘collusive-seeming equilibria’
| dc.contributor.author | McAdams, David | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-28T19:42:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-06-28T19:42:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The uniform-price auction is used in many regional electricity procurement auctions and its “collusive-seeming equilibria” have been linked to potential exercise of market power. Such equilibria do not exist, however, if a small amount of cash is split among rationed bidders. To shed light on what drives this result, I also examine variations in which the auctioneer is able to increase and/or decrease quantity after receiving the bids. “Increasable demand” also eliminates all collusive-seeming equilibria. These results suggest ways to modify the uniform-price auction in order to reduce the potential exercise of market power. | |
| dc.format.extent | 270407 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Manuscript, MIT [www. mit. edu/mcadams/papers/mupa. pdf] | |
| dc.subject | collusive-seeming equilibria | |
| dc.subject | uniform price auction | |
| dc.title | Modifying the uniform-price auction to eliminate ‘collusive-seeming equilibria’ | |
| dc.type | Journal article |
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