Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Date

2015-08-26

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Repository Usage Stats

191
views
361
downloads

Abstract

In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member’s contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others. We also find that participating in a democratic punishment procedure makes even non-contributors’ punishment intentions more pro-social.

Department

Description

Provenance

Citation

Scholars@Duke

Ambrus

Attila Ambrus

Professor of Economics

Professor Ambrus’ research focuses on a broad range of subjects including game theory, experimental economics, microeconomic theory, industrial organization, political economics, development economics and economic history. He has received various grants from the National Science Foundation. His most recent work has been published in the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, and Theoretical Economics.


Material is made available in this collection at the direction of authors according to their understanding of their rights in that material. You may download and use these materials in any manner not prohibited by copyright or other applicable law.