Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise'
| dc.contributor.author | Ambrus, A | |
| dc.contributor.author | Baranovskyi, V | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kolb, A | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-06T18:04:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-12-06T18:04:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-09-17 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This supplement provides welfare results not contained in the main text and a proof of Lemma A.1. For small bonuses, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if a downward equilibrium exists; if so, it is unique. For large bonuses, we find a unique candidate for mixed equilibrium and show that mixed and upward equilibria cannot co-exist. Also, we give an example for equal biases, where this candidate is indeed a mixed equilibrium. However, when biases are different enough and the bonus is high, a mixed equilibrium does not exist. Though a general analytical comparison is infeasible, we show that mixed equilibria are inferior to upward equilibrium or simple delegation in various special cases. | |
| dc.format.extent | 16 pages | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.relation.ispartof | Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) | |
| dc.title | Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise' | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| pubs.issue | 194 | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Duke | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Economics | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Trinity College of Arts & Sciences |