Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

dc.contributor.author

Yildirim, H

dc.date.accessioned

2010-03-09T15:32:05Z

dc.date.issued

2007-09-01

dc.description.abstract

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

dc.format.mimetype

application/pdf

dc.identifier.eissn

1095-7235

dc.identifier.issn

0022-0531

dc.identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1936

dc.language.iso

en_US

dc.publisher

Elsevier BV

dc.relation.ispartof

Journal of Economic Theory

dc.relation.isversionof

10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008

dc.title

Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

dc.type

Journal article

pubs.begin-page

167

pubs.end-page

196

pubs.issue

1

pubs.organisational-group

Duke

pubs.organisational-group

Economics

pubs.organisational-group

Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

pubs.publication-status

Published

pubs.volume

136

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