Institutions and inequality in single-party regimes a comparative analysis of vietnam and China
Abstract
Despite the fact that China and Vietnam have been the world's two fastest growing economies over the past two decades,their income inequality patterns are very different. An examination of the political institutions in the two countries shows that profound differences between these polities influence distributional choices. In particular,as compared to China,elite institutions in Vietnam encourage the construction of broader policymaking coalitions,have more competitive selection processes,and place more constraints on executive decision making. As a result,stronger political motivations exist for Vietnamese leaders to provide equalizing transfers that limit inequality growth among provinces than for Chinese leaders.
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Scholars@Duke
Edmund Malesky
Malesky is a specialist on Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. Currently, Malesky's research agenda is very much at the intersection of Comparative and International Political Economy, falling into three major categories: 1) Authoritarian political institutions and their consequences; 2) The political influence of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations; and 3) Political institutions, private business development, and formalization.
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