The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform
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2010-10
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Contrary to the conventional understanding that reform is more difficult when veto players are numerous, we show formally that veto players may encourage policy change by weakening the power of special interests that prefer inefficient reform outcomes. Using the same model, we demonstrate that reform reversals are less likely in the presence of multiple veto players, implying that a constitutional framework conducive to initial reforms may also lock in those achievements over time. We find support for our theoretical perspective in a study of the relationship between veto players and economic reform in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Copyright © Southern Political Science Association 2010.
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Gehlbach, S, and EJ Malesky (2010). The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform. The Journal of Politics, 72(4). pp. 957–975. 10.1017/S0022381610000460 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/17758.
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Edmund Malesky
Malesky is a specialist on Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. Currently, Malesky's research agenda is very much at the intersection of Comparative and International Political Economy, falling into three major categories: 1) Authoritarian political institutions and their consequences; 2) The political influence of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations; and 3) Political institutions, private business development, and formalization.
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