A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

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2021-11-01

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Abstract

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner's curse. We show that having a second expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from commitment to an "element of surprise" and prefers experts with equal rather than opposite biases.

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Ambrus, Attila, Volodymyr Baranovskyi and Aaron Kolb (2021). A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/23979.

Scholars@Duke

Ambrus

Attila Ambrus

Professor of Economics

Professor Ambrus’ research focuses on a broad range of subjects including game theory, experimental economics, microeconomic theory, industrial organization, political economics, development economics and economic history. He has received various grants from the National Science Foundation. His most recent work has been published in the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, and Theoretical Economics.


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