Delay as Agenda Setting

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2012-06-05

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Abstract

We examine a multi-issue dynamic decision-making process that involves endogenous commitment. Our primary focus is on actions that impact delay, an extreme form of lack of commitment. Delay is strategically interesting when decision makers with asymmetric preferences face multiple issues and have limited resources for influencing outcomes. A delayed decision becomes part of the subsequent agenda, thereby altering the allocation of resources. The opportunity to delay decisions leads the players to act against their short-run interests when they have strongly asymmetric preferences. Two classes of strategic activity emerge: focusing (reductions in delay) and pinning (increases in delay). We characterize these equilibria, explore how strategic delay alters the benefits to agenda setting, and develop implications for settings where bargaining is feasible. Our analysis applies directly to group, hierarchical, and coalitional decision making settings and illuminates a range of multi-market competitive interactions.

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Anton

James J. Anton

Wesley A. Magat Distinguished Professor of Business Administration

James J. Anton is the Hanes Corporation Foundation Professor in the Economics Area at the Fuqua School of Business. He also has secondary appointments in the Department of Economics at Duke and at UNC. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University 1984 and, prior to joining the Fuqua faculty in 1989, he served on the faculty at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.

Professor Anton's interests are in the area of applied microeconomic theory and industrial organization economics. His research focuses on issues involving information, incentives, contracting, and property rights in markets where strategic rivalry between firms is an important feature. He has published papers on innovation incentives and intellectual property rights, competitive pricing and sourcing, procurement contracts, auctions, incentive regulations, and antitrust issues.

Professor Anton has taught a variety of courses at Fuqua, including managerial economics, economic environment of the firm (macroeconomics), competitive analysis, and a course on global markets and institutions, and he has taught in several degree programs at Fuqua. His teaching has been recognized on past occasions, including the Outstanding Professor Award from the Global Executive Classes of 2003 and of 2001. In 2007, he received the Bank of America Faculty Award.

Professor Anton's research has been published in a variety of economics journals, including The American Economic Review, The International Economic Review, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies, The RAND Journal of Economics, The Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, The Journal of Public Economics, and The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and also in law and policy journals. He currently serves as an Associate Editor at The RAND Journal of Economics, on the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics, and, previously, as Associate Editor at Management Science and Co-editor of The Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.

On the personal side, Professor Anton is married and has two sons. He enjoys music and sports and, despite advancing years, continues to try to play volleyball.


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