The effect of market competition on bribery in emerging economies: An empirical analysis of Vietnamese firms
Repository Usage Stats
© 2020 Elsevier Ltd Studies of firm bribery have not fully examined how market competition conditions the effects of social norms on firms’ bribe payments. We suggest that firms pay bribes to obtain abnormal rents and/or to conform to accepted rules of corruption. These motivations operate differently, depending on the level of market competition. Using data from an annual survey of 10,000 Vietnamese firms between 2006 and 2017, we find that in environments characterized by open competition, bribery is positively associated with long-standing norms in the business social context, while in closed-competition environments, bribe payments are functions of rents that accrue from uncertainty in policy-making.
Business & Economics
Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104957
Publication InfoMalesky, EJ; Nguyen, TV; Bach, TN; & Ho, BD (2020). The effect of market competition on bribery in emerging economies: An empirical analysis of Vietnamese firms. World Development, 131. pp. 104957-104957. 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104957. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/22270.
This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
More InfoShow full item record
Professor of Political Science
Malesky is a specialist on Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. Currently, Malesky's research agenda is very much at the intersection of Comparative and International Political Economy, falling into three major categories: 1) Authoritarian political institutions and their consequences; 2) The political influence of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations; and 3) Political institutions, private business development, and formalization.
Articles written by Duke faculty are made available through the campus open access policy. For more information see: Duke Open Access Policy
Rights for Collection: Scholarly Articles
Works are deposited here by their authors, and represent their research and opinions, not that of Duke University. Some materials and descriptions may include offensive content. More info