Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
| dc.contributor.author | McAdams, D | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-09T15:32:14Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-09-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1095-7235 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | |
| dc.relation.isversionof | 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002 | |
| dc.title | Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| pubs.begin-page | 144 | |
| pubs.end-page | 166 | |
| pubs.issue | 1 | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Duke | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Duke Science & Society | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Economics | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Fuqua School of Business | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Initiatives | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Institutes and Provost's Academic Units | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Trinity College of Arts & Sciences | |
| pubs.publication-status | Published | |
| pubs.volume | 136 |
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